A Hack By Any Other Name

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) criminalizes forms of “hacking” other than actually breaking into a computer system — United States v. Nosal, 2013 WL 978226 (N.D .Cal. Mar. 12, 2013)

Nosal is back.  This is the case that spawned a Ninth Circuit decision narrowing the reach of the CFAA to hacking activity.  The case returned to the trial court after the Ninth Circuit decision.  The trial court recently convicted the defendant (David Nosal) of violating the CFAA.  But before analyzing the decision, let’s take a brief look at the background.

Nosal is a former employee of Korn/Ferry, an executive search and recruiting firm.  After leaving Korn/Ferry, Nosal obtained access to Korn/Ferry’s confidential and proprietary data with help from others.  In some instances, Nosal got Korn/Ferry employees to give their passwords to outsiders to enable them to access the firm’s computer systems.  In another instance, a Korn/Ferry employee logged onto the firm’s computer system using her password and then allowed a non-employee to use the system.  Nosal used the stolen data to start his own executive search business.  Nosal and his co-conspirators were indicted for violating the CFAA by exceeding authorized access to Korn/Ferry’s computers “knowingly and with intent to defraud.”

An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the CFAA’s prohibition on accessing computers “without authorization” or “exceeding authorized access” is limited to violations of restrictions on access to information, not restrictions on its use.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the CFAA primarily targets hacking rather than misappropriation of information.  The Ninth Circuit returned the case to the trial court to determine if Nosal violated the CFAA under its interpretation of the statute.

Nosal tried to persuade the trial court to push the Ninth Circuit’s rationale one step further.  Nosal argued that, since the CFAA is an anti-hacking statute, it is violated only when someone circumvents technological barriers to access to a computer.  Under this narrow interpretation, not every form of unauthorized access to a computer necessarily violates the CFAA.  The trial court disagreed with Nosal’s interpretation because the Ninth Circuit did not base CFAA liability on the manner in which access is restricted.  Moreover, password protection is a form of a technological access barrier, and Nosal and his co-conspirators clearly bypassed password restrictions.

Nosal next argued that his co-conspirators did not act “without authorization” because they used a valid password issued to a Korn/Ferry employee.  The court wasn’t enamored with this argument either.  Whether an act is authorized must be viewed from the perspective of the employer who maintains the computer system.  Clearly, an employer would not authorize an employee to allow another person to use his or her password.  Nosal attempted to analogize consensual use of an employee’s computer password to consensual use of an employee’s key to gain physical access to a building, a situation that Nosal argued would not violate trespass law.  The court also rejected this argumen.

Finally, Nosal argued that the Korn/Ferry employee who engaged in “shoulder surfing” (i.e., logging into the firm’s computer system and then letting another person use the system) did not engage in unauthorized “access.”   The court found no difference between an employee who gives her password to an outsider and an employee who logs into the firm’s computer system with her password and then lets an outsider use the system.  Both situations qualify as “access” under the CFAA.

LegalTXT Lesson: The CFAA targets hacking instead of misappropriation (so the Ninth Circuit says), but hacking could take various forms.  According to the latest Nosal decision, the CFAA criminalizes at least these forms: (a) breaking into a computer system; (b) letting an outsider use your password to access a system; (c) logging into a system with your password and then letting an outsider use the system.

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