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One of the requirements for proving a claim for trade dress dilution is that the claimant’s trade dress must be “famous.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).  Surveys to establish famousness are notoriously expensive.  Can social media provide a cheap alternative  to a survey?  Not exactly, but one court made a step in that direction.  Paramount Farms Int’l LLC v. Keenan Farms, 2012 WL 5974169 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2012), is the first case I know of that recognizes brand recognition among social media users as an indication of famousness.

In analyzing whether the plaintiff established the required elements of a trade dress dilution claim, the court in Paramount Farms noted that the plaintiff had a Facebook page with almost 300,000 “likes.”  The court did not regard the “likes” as conclusive evidence of actual recognition of the plaintiff’s associated trade dress, but did note that the brand’s Facebook popularity gave credence to other evidence that the trade dress has become famous.

Well, a Facebook “like” might not be protected under the First Amendment, but at least it’s good for something.

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The legal boundaries for school discipline for cyberbullying continues to be unclear — R.S. v. Minnewaska Area School District No. 2149, 2012 WL 3870868 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012); S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District, 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 2012)

As much as cyberbullying is gaining media attention, clear guidance on what schools can do about it is still lacking.  In January, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review three free speech challenges involving social media content posted by students.  As a result, courts continue to grapple with defining the boundaries of school discipline for student online conduct, particularly when it happens off-campus.  A pair of recent cases illustrates this trend.

R.S. v. Minnewaska Area School District No. 2149: A 12-year old sixth grader (R.S.) posted on her Facebook page that she “hated” her school’s adult hall monitor.  R.S. posted the comment from her home outside of school hours.  The comment somehow found its way to the principal, who considered the comment a form of bullying.  The principal gave R.S. detention and required her to apologize to the hall monitor.  In a second incident, R.S. posted a comment on her Facebook wall stating: “I want to know who the F%$# [sic] told on me.”  For this, R.S was suspended for a day and prohibited from going on a class ski trip.  On a third occasion, school officials learned that R.S. was communicating with a male student on the Internet about sexual topics (when confronted, the male student admitted that he initiated the conversation).  The school officials called R.S. out of class to meet with them and the deputy sheriff assigned to the school.  They demanded to know her email and Facebook usernames and passwords.  Feeling pressured, R.S. complied.  The school officials then logged into her Facebook account and viewed the public and private messages she had posted on the site.  The school did not formally discipline R.S. any further.

The punishment of R.S. violated her First Amendment right to free speech

Judge Davis of the federal district court of Minnesota looked to the Tinker line of cases for guidance and concluded that the First Amendment prohibits school authorities from punishing students for out-of-school statements the statements are true threats or reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are so egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption there.  R.S.’s Facebook posts were not threatening, the court found, and while the posts might have been reasonably calculated to reach a school audience, that possibility alone did not justify her punishment.  An out-of-court statement must be more than inappropriate.  It must potentially cause a substantial disruption in the school before it can be punished.

The school violated R.S.’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unlawful searches and seizures

Students enjoy a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by school officials.  But did R.S. have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the information posted on her Facebook account that only her Facebook friends could see?  The court said yes.  There is no meaningful difference between a password-protected private Facebook message and other forms of private electronic correspondence.  The court also found that the school officials had no legitimate governmental interest for reviewing her private communications.  Notably, there was no threat that R.S.’s private posts would cause a disruption in the classroom.

R.S. had a viable claim against the school for invasion of privacy

Again, the court focused on R.S.’s expectation of privacy.  The court analogized private Facebook messages to email messages, to which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.  The court summarily rejected the schools’ argument that R.S. used Facebook in violation of the site’s terms of use because she was a minor.  The court failed to see how a violation of a website’s terms of use could destroy an expectation of privacy.  Also unpersuasive was the school’s argument that R.S. compromised her privacy interest by allowing her mother and one other person view her Facebook account.  It would be unreasonable, the court explained, to conclude that a person gives up all expectation of privacy as to the contents of his or her password-protected email account just by showing an email to another individual.

S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District: Twin brothers (the “Wilsons”) who were high school juniors created a website called NorthPress.  Part of NorthPress was a blog intended to discuss, satirize, and “vent” about events at the Wilsons’ school.  Because the site was hosted on a Dutch domain, the site would not show up in the results of a Google search by a user in the U.S., but anyone knowing the site’s URL could access it.  The Wilsons added posts to the NorthPress blog containing a variety of offensive and racist comments as well as sexually explicit and degrading comments about particular female classmates whom they identified by name.  The racist posts discussed fights at the school and mocked black students.  A third student added another racist post.

The Wilsons initially told only several of their friends about NorthPress and claimed they intended only their friends to know about it, but word about the site quickly spread to the study body at their school.  The school initially suspended the Wilsons for ten days, and after the matter went through further proceedings at the school district level, the Wilsons were suspended for 180 days but allowed to enroll in another school for the duration of their suspensions.  The Wilsons filed a lawsuit for a preliminary injunction to lift the suspensions.  The district court granted the preliminary injunction, but on appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed.

Reviewing cases that analyze the applicability of Tinker to off-campus student speech, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the blog posts in question targeted the school, could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the environment, and caused considerable disturbance and disruption.  As a result, the Wilsons were unlikely to succeed on the merits, and so they were not entitled to an injunction.

LegalTXTS Lesson:  Cyberbullying is a serious issue, but schools should be careful not to overreact.  The reality is that much of the online material students post and share these days has a good chance of offending someone or being considered inappropriate by adults.  That doesn’t give schools the authority to police online content however they like.  Off-campus speech is punishable when it threatens to endanger danger to another student or cause substantial disruption in the school environment, but not merely because some would find it “inappropriate.”

How this rule is applied, however, depends on the sensitivity of the court.  The courts in R.S. and S.J.W. could have gone either way.  The court in R.S. could have concluded that the sexual conversations between two very young students presented a risk of substantial disruption in the classroom.  On the other hand, the court in S.J.W. could have held that the blog was never targeted at the school community, and therefore, its contents did not justify meting out school discipline.  Perhaps we’ll get more consistency in court rulings after Supreme Court decides to weigh in on the constitutional limits to combating cyberbullying.

 

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Facebook is being sued in a $15 billion lawsuit alleging that the popular social media company secretly tracked the Internet activity of its users after they log off (the First Amended Complaint is available here).  The case is a consolidation of nearly two dozen lawsuits filed in ten states, including one here in Hawaii (Quinn v. Facebook, Inc., 1:11-cv-00623).  The lawsuit alleges violations of the U.S. Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

In July, Facebook filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient injury.  At the hearing on the motion on October 5, Facebook’s attorneys argued that the plaintiffs haven’t identified the websites they visited, the kind of information that Facebook collected, or whether Facebook disclosed any information to anyone else.  The lawyer representing the subscribers countered that generalized allegations of harm are sufficient at this stage of the case, and that Facebook’s alleged practice of tracking their users’ Internet activity was not disclosed as part of Facebook’s privacy policy.   The court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss is pending.

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In two weeks, the NLRB has issued just as many decisions agreeing with the positions of the NLRB’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) on employee social media use, as stated in the OGC’s well-known guidance memos.  On September 18, the NLRB invalidated Costco’s policy prohibiting employees from making statements on social media that could damage the company or other employees’ reputations.  Yesterday, the NLRB publicly released a decision weighing in on the BMW dealership case that was discussed in the OGC’s August 18, 2011 memo. (The decision and briefing in the case are available here).

Here’s a quick review of the case for those not familiar with it.  A salesperson at a BMW dealership posted photos on Facebook showing a car that a test driver accidentally drove into a pond in front of a Land Rover dealership across the street (who shares a common owner with the BMW dealership).  The employee  included mocking comments about the incident in the post.  That same day, the employee posted photos on Facebook depicting the low-quality food and beverages that the BMW dealership provided at a sales event to promote a new car model.  Again, the employee accompanied the photos with sarcastic remarks.  The employee was discharged for the Facebook posts regarding the Land Rover incident.  The employee claimed that the primary reason for his discharge was the Facebook posts regarding the sales event, which he argued was protected activity.

The NLRB agreed with the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the discharge was based on the Land Rover posts, which were not concerted or protected activity because they were in no way connected to the terms or conditions of employment.  The ALJ’s decision also stated that the sales event posts could constitute concerted or protected activity because they could be construed as legitimate concerns about compensation.  Salespeople at the dealership were paid partly by commission, which are tied to sales.  Sales could be negatively impacted by damage to the reputation of the dealership due to the low-quality sales event.  The NLRB found it unnecessary to pass on the sales event posts, however, because the discharge was based on the Land Rover posts.

The NLRB also struck down a rule in the dealership’s employee handbook stating:

Courtesy: Courtesy is the responsibility of every employee.  Everyone is expected to be courteous, polite and friendly to our customers, vendors and suppliers, as well as to their fellow employees.  No one should be disrespectful or use profanity or any other language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership.

The NLRB found the rule overbroad, as it could have the effect of prohibiting employees from making protected statements to other employees about their working conditions.  However, a dissenting member of the NLRB’s three-member panel found that the courtesy rule was “nothing more than a common-sense behavioral guideline for employees” and that “nothing in the rule suggests a restriction on the content of conversations (such as a prohibition against discussion of wages)”.

LegalTXTS Lesson:  Here are three quick takeaways from the decision.

  1. Work rules regulating “offensive” social media activity should be vetted for any connection to concerted or protected activity, such as employee discussions about their compensation or the terms and conditions of their employment.
  2. “Courtesy” work rules similar to the one the NLRB struck down should be revisited to ensure they are specific enough to exclude protected activity.
  3. The positions taken in the OGC guidance memos are gaining credibility as the NLRB increasingly adopts those positions in published decisions.

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Employers should clarify ownership and control over social media accounts by which their employees promote the organization — Insynq v. Mann, No. 3:12-cv-05464 RBL, 2012 WL 3763550 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2012)

Earlier this year, the Phonedog v. Kravitz case attracted buzz on the issue of who owns a social media account that’s started by an employee, purportedly to promote his employer’s organization.  In PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the former editor-in-chief (Kravitz) of an online news service refused to relinquish the Twitter account on which he posted content promoting the company.   Kravitz argued that he owned the Twitter account because he personally opened the account and amassed its sizeable following of approximately 17,000 followers.  PhoneDog sued Kravitz for ownership of the Twitter account.

The issue hasn’t gone away.  The most recent case is Insynq v. Mann.  In that case, the employee (Mann) of an application service provider (Insynq) registered three domain names during her employment and began writing three blogs associated with each domain name.  After Insynq terminated Mann, it claimed ownership of the blogs.  Mann refused to give her former employer the credentials to the blog.  In the lawsuit that followed, Insynq sued Mann for breach of her non-compete agreement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition.

Cases like PhoneDog and Insynq are a good reminder that if an organization has its employees managing its social media activity, it needs to clarify who owns the social media account used by the employee and the contents of the account.  Otherwise, an organization might find itself fighting for control over a social media account after the departure of the employee responsible for managing the account.  Not having such control could lead to alienation of a painstakingly developed community of customers or fans, or worse, the inability to exercise editorial discretion over content about the organization being pushed out to the community.

To avoid messy disputes over ownership and control over social media assets, organizations should consider the following guidelines when developing social media policies:

  • Specify that only authorized employees may publish social media content on behalf of the organization, and that employees must use the organization’s official social media accounts when publishing such content.
  • Specify who owns the login credentials to the social media accounts used to promote the organization, as well as the content published on such accounts.
  • Require an employee who is responsible for managing the organization’s social media activity to disclose to his or her manager the login credentials for the accounts used for that purpose.  The employee should also be required to disclose any changes to the login credentials.
  • Prohibit employees from using the organization’s official social media accounts for their personal use.