Employers who discipline employees for their social media activity could unwittingly violate protections under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for employees who engage in “protected concerted activity.” An employee engages in protected concerted activity when acting together with other employees, or acting alone with the authority of other employees, for the mutual aid or protection of co-workers regarding terms and conditions of employment. Since social networks by nature connect people, online gripes about work—which could be read by co-workers of the author within the same social network—could constitute protected concerted activity. Three recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions highlight this risk.
In Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 NRLB No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012), an employee at a domestic violence relief organization posted on Facebook about a co-worker (Cruz-Moore) who threatened to complain about the work habits of other employees to the executive director of the organization. The employee wrote: “Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels that we don’t help our clients enough . . . . I about had it! My fellow coworkers how do u feel?” Four off-duty employees responded to this post with disagreement over Cruz-Moore’s alleged criticisms. Cruz-Moore saw these posts, responded to them, and brought them to the attention of the executive director. The employee who authored the original post and the employees who responded were fired. Two NLRB members of a three-person panel found the termination to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRB found the posts to be “concerted” because they had the “clear ‘mutual aid’ objective for preparing coworkers for a group defense to [Cruz-Moore’s] complaints.” The NLRB also considered the posts “protected” because they related to job performance matters.
In Pier Sixty, LLC, 2013 WL 1702462 (NLRB Div. of Judges Apr. 18, 2013), the service staff of a catering company were in the process of taking a vote on union representation when a staff member (Perez) got upset by what he perceived as harassment by his manager. During a break, Perez went to the bathroom and posted on Facebook: “Bob is such a NASTY M***** F****R don’t know how to talk to people!!!!! F**k his mother and his entire f*****g family!!!! What a LOSER!!!! Vote YES for the UNION.” Various co-workers responded to the post. The company fired Perez after learning about the post. An administrative law judge of the NLRB held that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. The judge found the post to constitute “protected activity” because it was part of an ongoing sequence of events involving employee attempts to protest and remedy what they saw as rude and demeaning treatment by their managers. The post was also “concerted” because it was activity undertaken on behalf of a union.
In Design Technology Group, LLC d/b/a Bettie Page Clothing, 359 NLRB No. 96 (Apr. 19, 2013), employees of a clothing store repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted to persuade their employer to close the store earlier so that they wouldn’t have to walk through an unsafe neighborhood at night. The employees posted Facebook messages lamenting the denial of their request and criticizing their manager. In one message, an employee said she would bring in a book on workers’ rights to shed light on their employer’s labor law violations. Another employee saw the messages and sent them to the HR director, who in turn forwarded them to the store owner. The owner fired the employees who posted the messages, allegedly for insubordination. A NLRB administrative law judge found the terminations unlawful because the messages were a continuation of an effort to address concerns about work safety (i.e., leaving work late at night in an unsafe neighborhood) and thus constituted protected concerted activity.
LegalTXTS Lesson: What should employers learn from these decisions? To avoid violating Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, employers might consider the following before disciplining employees based on their social media activity:
- Check whether the employee’s post attracted or solicited a response from co-workers. The interactive nature of social networking means that communications via social media are often “concerted.”
- Calls for co-workers to take action likely constitute “protected” activity.
- Complaints about work or co-workers—even if vulgar—can be considered “protected” activity.
- Messages posted outside of the workplace or work hours can still be considered protected concerted activity.
- Be especially sensitive to messages that reference collective bargaining activity or labor requirements. Those are red flags indicating the need to exercise caution.
- Often, social media is not the initial venue for airing work-related complaints. Investigate whether the complaints voiced online were previously brought to the attention of the employer. If they were, the online messages are more likely to be found to be part of a series of protected activity.
Proof of actual damages is not necessary to recover the minimum $1,000 in statutory damages under the Stored Communications Act — Shefts v. Petrakis, 2013 WL 1087695 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2013)
A person who brings a successful Stored Communications Act (SCA) claim can recover at least $1,000 without having to prove actual damages. In Shefts v. Petrakis, the plaintiff (Shefts) sued his former employer for violating the SCA by illegally accessing his various messaging accounts, including a Yahoo! email account. (See my post on an earlier decision in this case regarding after-the-fact authorization of access to emails.) Shefts did not seek actual damages, but instead, statutory damages under the SCA. The SCA states that “[t]he court may assess as damages . . . the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the sum of $1,000.” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c). The defendants argued that Shefts could not recover statutory damages without proving actual damages. Shefts countered that he may recover statutory damages as an alternative to actual damages.
The trial court agreed with Shefts. Finding no Supreme Court precedent on point, the court looked at the plain language of the damages statute, legislative history, and other district court decisions. The court found that the plain language of the statute entitled a successful plaintiff to obtain minimum recovery of $1,000 in statutory damages. The legislative history also evidenced the intent of Congress to allow recovery of at least $1,000. Also persuasive to the court were other district court decisions finding that the SCA does not require actual damages as a condition to recovery. The court’s ruling meant that, assuming Shefts could establish liability under the SCA, his failure to seek actual damages would not preclude him from recovering statutory damages.
Google acted as a “publisher” for CDA purposes for including third-party content in search results — Mmubango v. Google, Inc., 2013 WL 664231 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2013)
Google successfully obtained dismissal of a defamation lawsuit filed by a person (Mmubango) who found derogatory comments about him posted online. Mmubango discovered anonymous statements about himself on the “Wikiscams” website. Mmubango asked Google to remove the statements from its search engine and to give him information about the poster of the comments. Google refused.
Mmubango sued Google and others for defamation, and Google defended by moving to dismiss the claim based on Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunity. The federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed that Google met the requirements for CDA immunity. First, Google is an interactive computer service provider. Second, Google did not author the allegedly defamatory content, but instead, was provided with it by another information content provider (i.e., Wikiscams). The defamation claim alleged that Google was liable for storing and broadcasting the derogatory comments about Mmubango. Third, Mmubango was seeking to treat Google as the publisher of third-party statements. Deciding whether to provide access to third-party content or, alternatively, to delete the content is an act of publishing. Under section 230 of the CDA, Google could not be held liable for defamation based on its decision to publish a third party’s statements. The court dismissed Google from the case.