On January 1, 2017, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Office of the General Counsel released an advice memorandum (dated September 22, 2016) reviewing the social media policy in Northwestern University’s revised Football Handbook.  The memorandum contains valuable guidance in an area full of uncertainty, as the NLRB has struck down seemingly common sense social media policies because of their potential to chill employees’ rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to engage in “concerted protected activities.”  Section 8 of the NLRA prohibits employees from restraining employees from exercising their Section 7 rights.

According to the memorandum, Northwestern voluntarily revised its Football Handbook after receiving a charge alleging that the handbook violated the NLRA.  The advice memorandum reviewed the revised handbook for compliance with the NLRA.  Assuming for the purpose of the review that Northwestern’s football players are “employees” under the NLRA, the advice memorandum concluded that the revised social media policy passed muster.

The memorandum reprinted the original language of the policies along with the revisions in redline, as follows (deleted language in strikeout and new language in bold):

[W]e are concerned about… protecting the image and reputation of Northwestern University and its Department of Athletics and Recreation. . . .

Publicly posted information on social networking websites can be seen may be regularly monitored by any person with a smart phone or internet access, including individuals a number of sources within Northwestern University (e.g., Athletics Department, Student Affairs, University Police). . . .

Northwestern student-athletes should be very careful when using online social networking sites and keep in mind that sanctions may be imposed if these sites are used improperly or depict inappropriate, embarrassing harassing, unlawful or dangerous behaviors such as full or partial nudity (of yourself or another), sex, racial or sexual epithets, underage drinking, drugs, weapons or firearms, hazing, harassment, unlawful activity or any content that violates Northwestern University, Athletics Department or student-athlete codes of conduct and/or state or federal laws.

….

Do not post any information, photos or other items online that contain full or partial nudity (of yourself or another), sex, racial or sexual epithets, underage drinking, drugs, weapons or firearms, hazing, harassment or unlawful activity could embarrass you, your family, your team, the Athletics Department or Northwestern University.

Although the advice memorandum did not elaborate on why the original policy could violate the NLRA while revised policy would not, it provides important clues on drafting lawful social media policies.  The modifications to the policy generally substituted vague terms like “inappropriate” and “embarrassing” with descriptions of the content that the policy prohibits.  For example, the revised policy specifically prohibits social media posts depicting “nudity,” “racial or sexual epithets,” and “underage drinking,” among other things.  The revised policy also eliminated protection of the employer’s “image and reputation” from the description of the policy’s purpose.  In previous guidance, the NLRB has determined that employers may not require employees to refrain from engaging in activity that generally damages the employer’s reputation because that could be construed to prohibit “concerted protected activity” such as criticism of work conditions or compensation policies.

The recent advice memorandum reinforces the need to be precise when drafting a social media policy.  Experienced counsel can assist in identifying the types of social media content that the NLRB has allowed employers to prohibit employees from posting.

“It’s my First Amendment right to say what I want!”  The First Amendment is commonly invoked to justify personal expression.  But did you know that the First Amendment applies only when the government is involved?  For example, the First Amendment wouldn’t prevent a private company from firing an employee for making offensive comments about the governor.  If the same employee worked for a government office, then the First Amendment might apply.  As a lawsuit recently filed against the County of Maui illustrates, the First Amendment adds a layer of complexity for public employers dealing with controversial social media activity of its employees.

The First Amendment Lawsuit Against Maui County

Neldon Mamuad is a volunteer Liquor Commissioner for Maui County and part-time aide to a Maui County Council member.  In July 2013, Mamuad started a Facebook fan page called “TAGUMAWatch,” named after a Maui police officer well-known for strict enforcement of parking and traffic violations.  The page was intended to enable Facebook users to post about “Taguma sightings” and share their thoughts about him.  TAGUMAWatch gained popularity quickly and evolved into a discussion forum on a variety of topics including news, traffic, and politics.

Mamuad claims that he didn’t publicize his involvement with TAGUMAWatch until a TV news story about the page named him as its creator.   Mamuad also didn’t identify himself as a County employee when posting to the page or suggest that he spoke for the County.

The County somehow linked Mamuad to the page.  Allegedly under pressure from the County, Mamuad changed the page’s name to MAUIWatch.  A few days later, Officer Taguma submitted a complaint to the County alleging harassment via the page.  After notifying Mamuad of the complaint and conducting an investigation, the County determined that Mamuad had engaged in harassment and cyber-bullying through social media and required him to enroll in an employee counseling program.

On March 3, 2014, Mamuad sued the County in federal court for violating his First Amendment rights.  As of the time of this post, Mamuad’s motion for a TRO was pending.

When Does Employee Discipline Violate the First Amendment?

Most forms of internet expression qualify as “speech” under the First Amendment.  That point has been driven home by recent legal developments,  including a court decision that Facebook “likes” are protected by the First Amendment, a Ninth Circuit opinion recognizing that bloggers have the same First Amendment protections as traditional journalists, dismissal of an appeal from the termination of a public school teacher, and a federal lawsuit filed by a gun rights group alleging that the Honolulu Police Department censored comments on its Facebook page.  Whenever the government is the one restricting speech, the First Amendment becomes relevant.

So how does a public employer know when it may discipline an employee for his or her social media conduct without violating the First Amendment?  The general test in the Ninth Circuit, as spelled out in Mamuad’s TRO motion, looks at these factors:

  1. Did the employee speak on a matter of public concern?
  2. Did the employee speak as a private citizen or public employee?
  3. Was the employee’s protected speech a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action?
  4. Did the government have an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from other members of the general public?
  5. Would the government have taken the adverse employment action even absent the protected speech?

Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  For a court to find that employee discipline violates the First Amendment, the first and third question must be answered in the affirmative, the fourth and fifth question answered in the negative, and for the second question, the employee must have spoken as a private citizen.  The employee also has the burden to prove the first three factors.  If the employee is successful, then the burden shifts to the government to prove the fourth and fifth factors.

Applying this test to employee social media conduct isn’t simple, but it helps government employers assess whether the First Amendment counsels against disciplinary action.

Links:

Complaint in the Mamuad lawsuit
Motion for TRO in Mamuad lawsuit (w/o attached declarations and exhibits)

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